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Customer Reviews of The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War

He wrote the whole story, then went up the front walk..
Ralph Wetterhahn served our country with an exemplary fighter career. Like most of the best operators he is relentlessly self critical, and his modesty is most refreshing. The story he tells spilss over into the actions of politiocians and serving members of the armed forces. This book is a "must read" for all serving members and it shows how human everyone in the chain of command just happens to be. The flying, fighting, and policy making will make you think. There is a very serious aircraft accident, plenty of real frightening action, and the quiet, serious actions that made all the difference. You will squirm as rounds fly through your helo and its performance declines. I learned that a trumpet player from my band evacuated 78 Marines from Koh Tang Island under fire. I am so very grateful for this effort and more than ever value my friend's service. Ralph Wetterhahn also found out what happened to the three marines that were left behind, and he went up the front walk to tell their families. I have done that as well and it is the hardest thing to do on Earth. Please buy this book and encourage anyone who votes to read it. All our leaders are a picture drawn by their own experience. I think you will cheer and cry when you read this. I am looking forward to the next one... My best to you all,

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An alternative view
I have read LTC Wetterhahn's book and find that, while it makes interesting reading, it is factually lacking in numerous areas.
As a crewmember on the mission, I find many of the details of LTC Wetterhahn's book to be inaccurate, and thus he is led to some erroneous conclusions. As a low-ranking aircrew member (I had recently been promoted to first lieutenant at the time, flying as copilot aboard one of the HH-53 Jolly Green rescue helicopters), I was obviously not privy to many of the "behind the scenes" decisions which were unfolding during the incident. However, the aircraft I was on was involved in the battle from the initial insertion to the final pullout, logging 16 hours of flight time during the mission. Based on that, I feel relatively well qualified to comment on the tactical side of the operation.
As an example, on page 102, LTC Wetterhahn states "A talented A-7 strafer can routinely get off a very tight quarter-second burst, sending twenty or so rounds within a two-square-yard area." As a former project engineer at the Air Force Armament Laboratory, Guns and Rockets Branch, Eglin AFB, FL, I can tell you that, even if all weapons mounting and aiming tolerances were to be magically reduced to zero on the A-7s gun, the manufacturing tolerances of propellant load and projectile weight alone would still put the ballistic performance of the 20-mm gatling cannon on the A-7 outside of the range quoted in the book. Add back in the mounting, boresight and aiming system tolerances, and this statement is ludicrous. If the A-7 gunnery system was so accurate, why did it take multiple passes for the A-7s to neutralize the sunken gunboat off the north end of the island, as stated on p. 226? The fact is that the gunnery skills of the fighters, particularly the F-4s, was nowhere near what LTC Wetterhahn claims.
As to his major conclusions, on page 311, he writes: "Off the shores of Cambodia, the strategic imperatives of showing a "clear, clear" American victory resulted in the conscious abandonment of three Marines."
I, and all of the crewmember with which I have spoken since this book was released, take serious exception with this statement. There was no conscious decision to abandon anyone on the island. LTC Wetterhahn himself describes how TSgt Wayne Fisk stepped off the last departing helicopter, not once but twice, in an attempt to make sure we had everyone. TSgt Fisk did this at great risk to his own life. All of the crews still flying at the end of the day asked the command section numerous times to verify that all ground personnel were accounted for, and we were given an affirmative answer. To the best of our knowledge, we had all of the personnel on board with the departure of the last helicopter. All of the crewmembers who took part in this operation felt a great loss upon learning that some Marines were not recovered from the island, and we all salute the memories of the valiant servicemen who gave their lives in service to their country. However, as far as any "conscious abandonment" is concerned, I seriously disagree with LTC Wetterhahn's assessment on this point.
I further take exception to his conclusion, on page 259, that the seizure of the ship was the result of a decision by a local official rather than of the central government. I, for one, find it much more likely that the new government in Phnom Penh did, in fact, order the seizure of an American vessel as a way to show the world that it was in charge of the country which it had just taken over. With the example of the Pueblo to go on, and the fact that the US had just three weeks before been ejected from Vietnam, the Pol Pot government saw the situation as a prime opportunity to assert its authority and gain (at least, in its view) credibility with the world community by "tweaking the tiger's tail." They did not figure that President Ford would respond with a military action, and when it turned to mud around them, the high officials searched for a scapegoat. For LTC Wetterhahn to accept the word of an official of a government which went on to murder one-third of its own population is, in my opinion, excessively naïve. Such naivete casts doubts on the credibility of other statements credited to Khmer officials.
I agree with his assessment on one point, however, and that is that attempting to run tactical military operations from the highest levels of the government has been shown, on numerous occasions, to be a less-than-optimal method. In my opinion, it is the function and duty of the executive branch to determine the goals and objectives of the country's foreign policy. When such policy involves the use of military force, the determination of how to best do that should be in the hands of the military, with appropriate executive and Congressional oversight. Lyndon Johnson proved that running a war from the White House only guarantees defeat. Henry Kissinger, in this case, underscored that fact with his meddling in affairs with which he was unfamiliar. The failure of the command and control of this operation is well documented in LTC John Guilmartin's book "A Very Small War." This the lesson which should be remembered from the Mayaguez incident.
I further salute LTC Wetterhahn's dedication to investigating this incident. It is obvious from his writing that he has spent considerable time and effort, not to mention personal funds, to pursue this investigation. I merely disagree with most of the main conclusions of the book.
By the way, what happened to the review by Charles Brown? As a crewmember on one of the participating aircraft, I should think that his opinion would be represented.
Bob Gradle
Copilot, Jolly 43

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The Last Battle - USS Mayaguez
For most Americans, the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975 marked the end of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War at the price of over 58,000 dead servicemen and women. For a few hundred sailors, airmen, and Marines however, it ended two weeks later, with 41 more men giving their lives during heavy fighting not with North Vietnamese soldiers, but with Cambodian Khmer Rouge.

In The Last Battle, author Ray Wetterhahn tells the story of the seizing of the U.S. merchant ship S.S. Mayaguez in international waters off the coast of Cambodia by Khmer Rouge forces, and the U.S. military operation conducted to rescue the 40 civilian crew members. This operation was hailed as a victory for the presidential administration, a victory by the Khmer Rouge, a failure by troops in the action, and a debacle in leadership and command and control by military officers who participated.

As the story of this rescue operation unfolds, Wetterhahn describes in startling detail the mindset of President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, operational commanders, pilots and crews, Marines on Koh Tang Island, the crew of the Mayaguez, and the Khmer Rouge soldiers. A retired officer and Vietnam veteran with service in both the Navy and Air Force, he begins the story on the beaches of Koh Tang, where U.S. military members of Joint Task Force - Full Accounting (JTF-FA) are searching for the remains of 18 men killed during the rescue operation over twenty years before. While researching a story on JTF-FA and their recovery efforts, Wetterhahn discovers that three Marines may have been left alive on Koh Tang during the operation. Over the next five years, Wetterhahn's travels take him from the jungles of Koh Tang and Cambodia to the backwoods of West Virginia, where he tracks down the commanders, the troops, the politicians, and even the Khmer Rouge commander on Koh Tang. Shockingly, he confirms the worst fears of the Marine Commanders in 1975: a three-man machine gun team was left alive on Koh Tang, captured, imprisoned, and subsequently executed.

With the ending of America's involvement in the Vietnam War falling during the Ford presidential administration, a resounding victory and show of force was needed to prove to Americans that the administration was well equipped to handle any crisis. The Johnson administration failed to act when a similar event happened in 1968 as the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo, and were criticized by the American media during the eleven months of the crew's captivity, and interrogation, prior to their release. President Ford would not let this happen on his watch.

The advanced communications capabilities available in 1975 allowed President Ford, with Secretary Kissinger close at hand, to control nearly the entire operation from the comfort of the Oval Office. Breaking every rule of leadership and command and control, and him being a former Naval Officer, Ford and his staff began directing naval and air forces, and U.S. Marines toward Cambodia and Thailand. Not to be surpassed in poor leadership decisions, the Marine Corps chose as its ground combat element 2d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, a newly reported unit to Okinawa, instead of 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, which was nearing completion of a one-year rotation and was fully trained and acclimatized to the South Pacific. Extension of a unit past its 12-month mark required extensive administrative efforts, and would not be approved by Headquarers, Marine Corps.

In the 48 hours following the seizure of the Mayaguez, reports from pilots, imagery analysis, and diplomatic information began pouring in to Ford. Critical information was summarized ad reduced to little value and a key item was lost in the shuffle: a pilot saw numerous Caucasian men being transported to the Cambodian mainland in a trawler from Koh Tang Island.

Wetterhahn's interviews of military commanders and soldiers reveal that the Marines received no imagery of Koh Tang island prior to the mission, radio frequencies were not exchanged between air and naval forces, and the mission commander attempted to direct the entire mission, to include forward air control, on one tactical radio frequency. When the Air Force helicopters attempted to land the first Marines on the beaches, they landed directly in the line of fire of entrenched machine guns and within rocket range. Three helicopters were shot down in the first 40 minutes.

Just three hours after the first Marines hit the beach of Koh Tang, Cambodia released the Mayaguez crew from where they were held on the mainland. As the celebration and press conferences begin in Washington, Ford orders the cessation of operations in Cambodia. The battle raged on for nine more hours before the Marines could be extracted. Two hours later, it was determined three Marines were unaccounted for. When Wetterhahn asked former President Ford if he was ever told that three Marines were left behind, he replied, "Not to my best recollection."

Wetterhahn's investigative reporting is unparalleled, as he doggedly sought to find the truth behind the missing three Marines and what really happened on Koh Tang. Previous books have been written regarding the Mayaguez Incident, but The Last Battle encapsulates all aspects of the operation and lets the reader see the chaos of war and the results of poor leadership, at every level. While this story is titled The Last Battle, only through respect for the men who gave their lives attacking an island with no value and no prisoners, should it not be named The Last Blunder.