Cheap Russia's War: Blood Upon The Snow (Book) (Richard Overy) Price

Related Products

Customer Reviews of Russia's War: Blood Upon The Snow

A good introduction to the crucial issues of Soviet German War
Overy's book is more about the Why of the Soviet War with Nazi Germany and its allies, than any kind of detailed picture of day by day or even month by month events in the war. Nor does it focus solely on military activities in the way a book oriented to what I consider hideous "war buffs" would. So for those with an almost pornographic desire to learn the minutiae of military operations, weapons, etc, this book will be a disappointment. <
> <
> Bigger questions were involved in the war, and this is Overby's concern as in his masterpiece that I high recommend _Why the Allies Won__ <
> <
> This is a book that examines the question of war and especially the Army in the Stalinized Soviet Society and discusss how the Soviet Union functioned during the war, as well as what the Soviet Union did, but its real riches are why things happened as they did, even if you are like myself and do not share his analysis of Soviet Society. <
> <
> Overby takes advantage of the release of many Soviet paper, memoirs and statistics since the fall of the Soviet Union to answer a number of the pending big questions of the Soviet-German war. For example, he verifies from secret documents of both the Poles and the Soviet leadership that it was not any decision by Stalin to see the Polish nationalist revolution Warsaw crushed in 1944, but the exhaustion of the Soviet Offense that had been only designed to advance through BeloRussia but had been able to enter Poland, and the desire of the leaders of the Polish rebels NOT to cooperate with the Red Army. Likewise, he records statements by both Stalin Zhukov that allied economic and military aid was decisive in the USSR's ability to survive against Hitler. <
> <
> By mapping military power in the Soviet Union starting with the seizure of governmental power by Stalin and his clique in the 1924, Overby provides a summary history and discussion of basic questions not only of Soviet History, but Soviet Society. He continues that discussion after the war with a discussion of the results of the war on the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's role in World power. Inas much as he focuses on Stalin's role in all of this, he continues that discussion until Stalin's death in 1952. <
> <
>Overy rejects both the evil-empire demonification of the Stalin regime popular in some writing about the War, and also rejects the gloriciation of or ignoring of the STalinist tyranny. Armed with recent revelations, Overy surveys what a disaster the Stalin regime was starting with its force collectivation and superindustrialism and how the same dictatorial regime that carried out the purges continued during the Soviet-German War. <
> <
> While Overby seems to be quite knowledeable about revelations about the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during the war, there are a few things that he seems to be unaware of in regard to the pre-War Stalin regime. He seems to have no understanding how and why the purge trials began beyond paranoia on the part of Stalin. <
> <
> We now know that Leon Trotsky's analysis of the purge trials when they happen was exactly right. In fact, Stalin began his purges when he learned that even within the bureaucratic elite in the Communist party tops, his rule was despised. At the famous Congress of Victors, Sergi Kirov, not Stalin was elected as General Secretary. This insured Kirov's assasination and a war of persecution against any section of Soviet society that could gather in opposition, starting with the Communist Party itself. <
> <
> Overby is good at assessing the disasterous role Stalin's attempts to run the Soviet war effort were in the first two or three years of the war. Since he isn't pilloring Stalin, but trying to find the truth, he is honest enough to point out that by late 1943, Stalin had learned the error of his ways and began listening to his commanders and allowing them to make more and more decisions. <
> <
> Overby also tells us that the victory of the Soviet Union was not inevitable and that the idea that the USSR won only because of overwhelming numbers of Soviet Solders were availble is also a myth. I won't tell you his answers to these questions, because I believe you should read his book and learn the answers. <
> <
> Even though I disagree with much of his analysis, this book is essential because of the questions he tries to deal with. Overby is also modest enough to say that the amount of information that has been released since the opening of the Soviet archives is so vast, the amount of material still kept secret by the successors to Stalin still drawn from the bureaucracy still hides is still so great in concentrated questions, and the historical questions so large, that real answers will not be avilable for years. His book also serves as a succint and correctly prioritized summary of the war with the most important social, economic, political, and military issues linked. It is a good introduction for someone beginning to study this issue criticially. <
> <
>I also recommend his book Why the Allies Won.

---

Most Reader Friendly Synopsis of the Russian Front!
Richard Overy argues the USSR persevered in a war that by all accounts, it should have lost. By all appearances, the Soviet Union in 1941 suffered from backwardness both economically, as well as, militarily. At least this is what Hitler was counting on when he decided to undertake the enormous task of invading the Soviet Union in June. Overy argues it was the combined factors of economic mobilization, a flexible military command structure, and, most importantly, the enduring spirit on the Russian people that enabled Stalin's Russia to emerge victorious. A central theme throughout the book is Russia's ability to bounce back after a series of initial demoralizing defeats. Nowhere, says Overy, is the term "total war" more applicable than to the Russian people during what became known as the "Great Patriotic War." The author takes a narrative approach incorporating social history with military accounts. Paradoxically, however, the social aspect of this work outweighs the military analysis. In essence, this contradiction in methodologies from what one might expect from an actual military historian provides the book's strength. The book is intended to be a companion volume to a ten-part film documentary produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Accordingly, the book's ten chapters correspond to the video titles. In keeping with the film's structure, Overy seldom strays from the Russian perspective. The result is a refreshing treatment of the Eastern front in the Second World War.                 The author mainly consults secondary sources and scholarly journal articles throughout the text. At the same time, he makes every attempt to utilize the most recent publications. Surprisingly, however, Overy fails to consult Russian language sources. Instead, he gleans from other's research into the recently opened archival material. This second-hand gathering of information is also apparent with regard to casualty figures for which he has come under some criticism. Unfortunately, his reluctance to consult Russian language sources reinforces the fact that Russian scholarship perhaps lies beyond the grasp of his expertise. Overy also incorporates interviews from Russian participants, an obvious reflection of the film documentary.                 It is difficult to convey the causes and affects of as vast a topic as the Great Patriotic War in a one-volume treatment. Within these limitations, however, Overy has accomplished his task admirably with a clear and engaging style. Overy attempts to dispel some popular myths utilizing new evidence, which, as already mentioned, he acquired second hand. For instance, the author suggests Stalin's military purges of the 1930's did not undermine Russian military effectiveness as commonly believed, but rather, cleared much dead wood and made way for a younger professionally trained officer corps. Secondly, Overy shows how Stalin was prepared to intervene militarily if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia. Lastly, Overy contends the second Molotov pact actually proved advantageous to Stalin allowing him to buy time for what he perceived as an inevitable war with Germany. Again, owing to limited space, only the most prominent battles such as Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kursk, and Berlin are examined within these pages. As a result, the book contains an imbalance of battle narrative and engaging military analysis found in other works as: John Erickson's seminal two-volume standard "The Road to Stalingrad" (1975; 1999) and "The Road to Berlin" (1983; 1999) and, more recently, David M Glantz & Jonathan House "When Titans Clashed" (1995. See my Amazon review). It is the seldom-covered aspects of the war, on the Eastern Front however, that shine in Overy's book. The chapter describing "The Fight from Within: Collaboration, Terror, and Resistance" (pp. 159-189) is the strongest component. Overy's coverage of mounted Cossack bands fighting alongside the Germans against their own countrymen; the Kaminsky Brigade slaughtering Polish civilians; Andrei Vlasov's change of ideological heart to form and lead an ill-fated Russian Liberation Army are topics not usually found in other treatments of the Russian front. Overy also includes the plight of the Polish Jews and Partisan warfare and the German reaction to it. Overy's description of Partisan bands (otriad) roving the countryside, living off the land at the expense of starving Russian peasants adds yet another dimension to this complex and bitter struggle. It is this social element, and friendly readability that makes this volume a significant addition to the history of the Soviet Union in World War II.

---

Good Broad Overview of the Eastern Front....
Overy's Russia's War is an excellent book for readers who wish to gain a broad perspective on the Eastern Front and the struggle of the Soviet nation against the 1940 German invasion. Overy writes in an easily digestible style, and draws from a broad range of sources that give new detail and life to the political, economic, and social forces behind the Soviet victory. <
> <
>One interesting point Overy makes, which flies somewhat in the face of most historians, is that the purges of the Red Army officer corps in 37-39 did not affect the quality of the Red Army as much as believed. Overy remarks that the purge of officers made no quantitative difference in the Red Army because of the influx of new officers at the same time, and by the time the war started, there was little qualitative difference. I tend to disagree, as the Red Army suffered from the loss of many field grade officers that had combat experience in the 1st World War or Russian civil war. Tactical losses early in the war speak to inexperienced officers and NCOs. <
> <
>For a more detailed study of units and battles, Seaton's Russo-German War is a better choice, but Overy's book is quite good for a generalistic overview that addresses not only how the Soviets won, but how they mustered the effort.