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Solid, Readable History
Shirer's solid narration on the troubled history of the French Third Republic (1870-1940) explains how decades of monarchism, anti-semitism, and bitter divisions weakened France and contributed to the 1940 collapse. When Shirer covers the 1940 debacle in the later chapters, it seems almost pre-destined. I liked the author's strong attention to the 1930's, when weak French governments failed to confront a re-arming Nazi Germany. William L. Shirer (1904-93) was a U.S. journalist in Europe from 1925-40 who later spent years researching the rather baffling subject of the decline of France. This volume doesn't quite match his "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich," but Shirer's immense talents are evident, and Charles De Gaulle complimented his objectivity.

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SHIRER'S MASTERPIECE CHRONICLES FRANCE'S DISGRACE
Although not as famous as Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", this book is just as important. The book gives a survey of the history of the French Third Republic from its founding in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1870, through its crisis in the Dreyfus Affair, victory in World War I and finally to the debacle of 1940. The author has the unique background of being both an accomplished journalist as well as a serious historian which gives the book a very readable style. What particularly appealed to me is his moral passion. He is no "objective, neutral observer". He is a Francophile who is willing to expose the terrible weaknesses that brought down the country he loves so much. The fact that he, as a newspaper correspondent, personally witnessed the horrors of Nazi Germany before the war gives a fervor to his writing that is refreshing in this day and age of viewing history as merely a comparison of the various "narratives" of the different sides in a conflict.
Shirer begins by pointing out the important fact that at the constituent assembly that wrote the constitution for the Third Republic, the majority of the delegates were, in fact, monarchists, but they could not decide if the king should be from the House of Bourbon or Orleans, so a republican form of government was chosen as a compromise. Thus, the new regime started out on the wrong foot as something no one really wanted. Throughout its 70 years history there were always strong anti-republican movements that threatened the very existence of the regime, chronic political instability and resistance to necessary reforms (for example, women were given the vote only after World War 2). In the military realm, the exhaustion resulting from the terrible losses in World War 1 combined with a reluctance to change the strategies that worked then and obliviousness to major technological changes in armored and aerial warfare led to the ossification of the army high command and the development of the "Maginot mentality".
In spite of all the disadvantages, when the German invasion began in 1940, the French stood a good chance of halting the invader. It has been repeatedly demostrated in modern warfare that the defense is very strong and that the attacker usually needs to have a clear superiority in order to prevail. Shirer demolishes the myths propagated by French Commander Weygand and others that the Germans had overwhelming superiority. In numbers of men and tanks the two sides were pretty evenly matched and the French tanks were of superior quality. The French officer corps was also much more experienced than that of the Germans because of the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. The Germans took unbelievably huge risks in mounting their main attack through the Ardennes where there were few roads and some well-aimed air or artillery attacks could have upset the whole German plan. It is true that the Luftwaffe had aerial superiority but the author shows that large numbers of French aircraft were inexplicably never sent into battle (the French Air Force had more aircraft available at the end of the campaign than at the beginning!) French troops fought valiantly in many engagements, especially in holding the perimeter at Dunkirk allowing many more men to escape back to England. This disproves the claim that all French felt resentment to the British or were not willing to fight to save their country.
So, the question remains, what brought about the sudden collapse? Once Petain started talking about an armistice, resistance collapsed. The military setbacks were exploited by unscrupulous anti-republican leaders like Petain, Laval and Weygand in order to overthrow the hated republican regime.
The disgrace of France in 1940 was not that they were defeated on the battlefield in metropolitan France. The British, Russians and Americans also suffered grievous setbacks early in the war before turning things around. The disgrace is that (1) they refused to continue the war from their colonies in North Africa where they could be protected by their powerful navy, (2) they accepted humiliating, immoral armistice terms that forced 1.5 million French POW's to remain interned for the duration of the war and agreeing to hand over refugees who had found haven from the Nazis in democratic France, many of whom were subsequently murdered and (3) the pro-republican leaders (especially the Socialists) allowed themselves to be meekly stampeded into voting the republican regime out of existence and granted unlimited dictatorial powers to Petain who then set up a new regime called the "French State" (instead of "Republic") which instituted a totalitarian regime that ultimately arrested the former leaders of the republic and other opponents (even murdering some of them like Mandel and Zay), handed Jews over to the Nazis to be annihilated and, finally, openly collaborating with them to the point of even agreeing to supplying the Germans with forced labor. Shirer mentions at the end of the book that many patriotic Frenchmen, years after the war, felt that their leaders were right in capitulating because "it saved another bloodbath like that of 1914-1918". Shirer points out that France's freedom was restored by the sacrifice of millions of Russian, British and American lives (among others). I think this obtuseness, or, alternately, a strong feeling of shame, explains why many Frenchmen have such a prickly attitude to Americans.
The lesson of this book is that a nation can have all the material, technological and military advantages but without internal solidarity, a sense of national dignity and a will to make sacrifices for its freedom, it can fall in an instant. This should serve as a warning for future generations.

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The best study on why democracies sometimes fail
This book is simply superb, and in the best tradition of William Shirer. No pictures, a few maps, and over 800 pages of simply excellent historical prose. In my mind, this book is more important than Shirer's more renowned "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (which two books should be read as companions.).

The text begins in 1870, with French suffering their overwhelming defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. A non-monarchical, democratic form of government was established, but was weak from its inception. A preview of Fascism of fascism called Boulangism very neary toppled before 1000 was even reached. The shameful Dreyfus affair is carefully chronicled, as are the numerous other French failings leading up to World War I.

Shirer covers this war masterfully, showing the French barely avoided catastrophe, with special emphasis being placed upon the immense casualties the French Army suffered. Luck and perhaps, Providence overcame mutinies, influenza, and occasional inept strategy, and the French and their allies won over the Central Powers The Versailles Treaty, ending the war, was heavily punitive, at French insistence, leading to German resentment and extremism, and, ultimately, to World War II. The French never saw it coming.

Now begins the most fascinating part of the book;, the time between the end of World War I and 1940. The French government was headed by a succession of Premiers who were either pathetically weak /oblivious to reality, or both. An excellent case in point is Eduoard Daladier, who was primarily responsible for the state of the vaunted French Army, and who took part in appeasing Hitler at Munich in 1938.

Although Daladier definitely should have known that Maurice Gamelin, the Generalissmo of the Army, was manifestly unfit for the job, he, as with Leon Blum, and numerous others, kept this vacillating coward, who would not accept the urgency of German actions, on the job. Shirer carefully shows how Gamelin, and many of his subordinates lived in the past, refusing to study new tactics dictated by fast moving masses of armor, refusing to accept the role of air power, refusing to accept intelligence reports showing a German invasion was coming and where, etc. The result was inevitable.

While Gamelin enjoyed dinners, and puttered in a post far back from the front, the French Army was decimated at Sedan, and in Flanders, and, five days into the war, Gamelin calmly accepted defeat. Time and again, a little planning could have avoided this outcome. Shirer's well-researched narrative leads the reader to wonder why Gamelin wasn't executed or imprisoned for dereliction of duty after the war.

Eventually, the French capitulated, and the sorry chapter of the Vichy Armistice began. After the Allies finally drove the Germans out, a different government was instituted, but the consequences of Third Republic's failures live with us yet.

If there is a hero in thie sorry batch of leaders after WW I, it is Paul Reynaud, a Churchillian figure, who became Premier far too late to alter what his predecessors had allowed to lapse. Reynaud wanted to fire Gamelin, but Daladier would not have it.

If this book shows anything, above all else, it shows that strong leadership is needed to preserve a democracy, and that the consequence of weakness and vacillation in the face of a determined enemy leads to appalling catstrophe. These lessons are relevant even in our own time.

The text is well-orgainized, and painfully explict in terms of the ebb of the Third Republic. I found Shirer to be very objective. The book is very long, but well worth the read. I recommend it very highly