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| AUTHOR: | Gar Alperovitz |
| CATEGORY: | Book |
| MANUFACTURER: | Penguin USA (P) |
| ISBN: | 0140083375 |
| TYPE: | 1945-1953, Foreign relations, History: American, Soviet Union, U.S. Foreign Relations, United States |
| MEDIA: | Paperback |
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Customer Reviews of Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam : The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation With Soviet Power
Atomic Baloney: What a Bomb! Atomic Diplomacy was originally a doctoral dissertation arguing that American leaders saw the atomic bomb as a powerful "master card" that would strengthen their hand against the Soviets and thereby help advance American interests during the summer and early fall of 1945. Although there is a great deal of information contradicting its conclusions, the paper somehow received a passing grade.
At its core, the book is merely a small addition to the academic literature on one aspect of the use of the atomic bomb. The implications drawn from it, however are sensational: Namely that the bomb was dropped for political, not military reasons and that its use is therefore the equivalent of a war crime. In addition, blame for the Cold War can largely be placed at America's feet.
We are informed by way of a ridiculous consipiracy theory that there was no military necessity to drop the bombs. This theory relies on speculation and gross distortion of the historical record. It is said that Japan was ready and willing to surrender but that Truman did not want to allow this to happen out of fear that the opportunity to demonstrate the bomb's power would be lost. Tentative Japanese efforts to enlist the Soviets' help in negotiating highly lenient peace terms are misinterpreted and inflated to the level of Japan's waving a white flag. Post-war opinions by various authorities stating that winning the war without the bomb would have been a snap are presented as fact. Reports about Japan's deteriorating position and other issues that were written before the bombs were dropped are quoted selectively and taken out of context. For example there is no mention of the appalling U.S. casualties suffered during the battle of Okinawa. This cost was one of the key considerations in the decision to drop the bomb. Such rhetorical tricks run rampant through the book and far from clearing up misconceptions that might occur about the book as the author hopes, they instead cast a shadow over its veracity.
Like Alperovitz's later work on the subject, Atomic Diplomacy is rarely coherent or believable in the light of the complete facts. True, there is much evidence that some American leaders hoped that the bomb might yield benefits beyond ending the war with Japan. These hopes were soon proven false, however, and were not the main reason the bombs were used. Despite this, Alperovitz still caims that the bomb didn't just influence American foreign policy - it determined policy.
Truman's various attempts to engage the Soviet Union during mid-1945 are portrayed as being part of a dark conspiracy of intimidation. Alperovitz says that Truman had no intention of reaching any agreements with the Soviets at Potsdam, for example, because he believed that the use of the atomic bomb on Japan would put the U.S. in a better position to negotiate later. This argument is supported by a letter from Truman complaining that the trip to Potsdam was a chore that he would rather avoid. Alperovitz chopped out the part of this statement that makes its real meaning clear - Truman was venting frustration to his Mother about having to wear tails.
Considering that the atomic bomb was used against Japan, it is surprising that only one chapter of the book deals specifically with Asia. This chapter tries to make the case that the war in the Pacific hardly counted for anything to American policy makers because it was obvious to all that Japan was defeated by this time. It's never mentioned that the Japanese government did not recognize this reality and was in fact implementing plans to repel the expected American invasion. It is implied that American leaders had clairvoyant power that allowed them to foresee that Japan would surrender before an invasion was to take place. Truman is said to have determined that the war would have to end by August 8th, solely in order to keep the Soviets out of Asia. This moronic claim can only be accepted if one believes that the war with Japan represented nothing more to Turman than an opportunity to give a "battle demonstration" of the atomic bomb's power to the Soviets.
Much of the book deals with the early post-war situation in Europe. Its purpose is to show how the West attempted to bully the perfectly reasonable Soviets once they decided the atomic bomb would give them an advantage. A sinister face is put on Western attempts to prevent what would be fifty years of tyranny in Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Frank Byrnes's statement that the bomb would allow the U.S. to "dictate our own terms" is taken out of context repeatedly as though it applied to the Soviets when it actually referred to the Japanese. Many other sources are similarly mangled in a constatnt effort to make the facts conform to preordained conclusions. Endless footnotes and appendices are used both to hedge the book's conclusions and to attack other books that provide contradictory information.
Alperovitz awards himself a large amount of credit for originating the belief that the atomic bomb was used as a warning to the Soviets. In fact, the famously paranoid Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was the first to make this assertion only a few days after the bombs were dropped, and by the end of this book you actually feel sorry for the dictator. His opinion was echoed in the West as early as 1946, and the use of the bomb was called "the first shot of the Cold War" well before Atomic Diplomacy was written.
Prompt and Utter Destruction by Samuel Walker, however, provides an excellent overview of these issues. It is unbiased, highly informative and concise. These qualitites stand in sharp contrast to Atomic Diplomacy's long and misleading attempt to inflate a molehill of truth into a mountain of exaggeration.
Its not about whether to drop the bomb or not
The above reviews suck...Ok, the book if you (with exception to the third review) read the preface jackson, is about "HOW" the bomb was used in dimplomacy...ok, just read the title maybe that will give you a clue..bible of revisionism give me a break.
Great book -
All indications from the secret negotiations between the Americans and the Japanese and, retrospectively, from the complete devastation of Japan point to Dr. Alperovitz's claim: The atomic bombs were unnecessary for the war's conclusion.
Given the fact that more than 200K civilians were specifically targeted and instantaneously incinerated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this book leaves me the following thought: What a dreadful sin we have committed ...